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This paper presents a theoretical fra-
mework for comparative research on 
broadcasting regulation in Europe, 
exploring and contributing to the de-
bate on National Regulatory Authori-
ties (NRAs). The study seeks to build 
on Lijphart’s (1999) and Hallin and 
Mancini’s (2004) groundbreaking 
typologies of democracy and media 
systems to create a broader classifica-
tion of NRAs. We focus on institutional 
aspects such as the appointment of 
heads and budget frameworks, dis-
cussing the potential for autonomy 
of regulators. Preliminary evidence 
suggests a strong correspondence 
between the degree of autonomy of 
NRAs and elements of consensus and 
majoritarian democracies. Examining 
regulatory authorities and the factors 
underlying their outcomes add new 
dimensions for measuring the perfor-
mance of NRAs. 
Key words: NRAs, media systems, 
consensus, majoritarian democracy.
Aquest article desenvolupa una nova 
aproximació teòrica per a la recerca com-
parada sobre la regulació de radiodifusió a 
Europa, que explora i contribueix al debat 
sobre les National Regulatory Authorities 
(NRA). L’estudi tracta d’aprofitar les tipo-
logies de Lijphart (1999) i Hallin i Mancini 
(2004) sobre la democràcia i els sistemes 
de mitjans de comunicació per tal de rea-
litzar una classificació més àmplia sobre 
les NRA. Se centra en els aspectes institu-
cionals com ara el nomenament dels alts 
càrrecs i els marcs pressupostaris, tenint 
en compte les possibilitats d’autonomia 
dels reguladors. Les primeres evidències 
suggereixen una forta correspondència en-
tre el grau d’autonomia de les NRA i els 
elements de les democràcies consensuals 
i majoritàries. Així doncs, s’estudiaran les 
autoritats reguladores i els factors sub-
jacents als seus resultats per tal d’afegir 
noves dimensions a l’hora de mesurar 
l’actuació de les NRA.
Paraules clau: NRA, sistemes de co-
municació, democràcia consensual, 
democràcia majoritària.
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Mass media and broadcasting in particular are considered important “for the proper functioning of a democratic society” (Council of Europe, 2008). Being responsible for “airing civil affairs and poli-
tical debates”, broadcasting is under the “legitimate constant pressure” of 
legislators and govern ments (Open Society Institute, 2005). Political com-
munication scholars have questioned “whether democracy is automatically 
supported when freedom of broadcasting is guaranteed or whether, instead, 
additional assurances are necessary” (Hoffmann-Riem, 1996). The traditional 
hypothesis that higher levels of democracy also infer higher levels of media 
freedom has not yet been demonstrated convincingly, although this assump-
tion accounts as a basis for understanding the relationship between media 
and political systems (Hanretty and Koop, 2012). Exploring the contrasts 
between media systems and the division of political power in democratic or 
authoritarian nations creates the premises for a comparative perspective on 
the interrelations between media and politics. 
Broadcasting is extensively regulated because it uses a limited natural resour-
ce, the radio spectrum, managed by national governments and international 
authorities. From the institutional perspective, three major trends have influen-
ced the regulatory authorities and their outcomes for independence: setting up 
independent regulators, involving competition authorities and endowing con-
vergent regulatory institutions on telecommunications and broadcasting (Spyre-
lli, 2003). Regulatory agencies are “subordinated bodies, supervised by a minis-
try. Each combine legislative, executive and judicial functions, interpret, define 
and supervise rules, and introduce sanctions” (Baldwin and Cave, 1999). Some 
of the key tasks are the following: assigning frequencies, licensing, monitoring, 
enforcement and sanctioning, appointing management bodies. 
The advent of National Regulatory Authorities for broadcasting (NRAs) has 
stimulated the academic debate on the causal links between the institutional 
design and the regulatory outcomes. In this regard, this study seeks to build on 
Lijphart’s (1999) and Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) typologies of democracy and 
media systems a broader classification of NRAs in 47 European countries. Our 
primary research focus is to measure the potential for autonomy of NRAs, testing 
two indicators: appointment of heads and budget frames. We debate whether 
the patterns of Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) ideal media systems can be observed 
when studying the institutional design of broadcasting regulators in democra-
tic contexts. We address the questions of institutional similarities or contrasting 
cases of NRAs across Europe and we explore how the proposed variables can be 
evaluated according to Lijphart’s dimensions of democracy. The connection bet-
ween NRAs and political systems is narrowly postulated in the literature. There 
is no systematic comparative approach on broadcasting regulation in Lijphart’s 
(1999) and Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) axiomatic perspectives on democracy 
and media systems. Therefore, the innovative groundwork of our contribution 
might have a strong impact, filling the existing theoretical and empirical gap in 
the communication scholarship.
This paper is structured as follows. First, it gives a brief overview of the recent 
contribution to the core of broadcast regulatory philosophy. Secondly, Lijphart’s 
(1999) and Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) theories are summarized and the innova-
tion of this research is argued. The subsequent section discusses the variables to 
be investigated and the methodology to be used. Finally, we review the potential 
configuration of the macro-analytical framework of broadcasting regulators. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Comparative research on media and political systems provides little systematic 
theoretical and empirical evidence to support the links between institutional 
arrangements and types of democratic regimes. The research to date has ten-
ded to focus on particular and specific national cases rather than cross-country 
comparative studies. Communication scholarship and public policy are “weakly 
connected” (Neuman, 2003). Although the literature on regulation is immense, 
the number of studies dealing with the political aspects of regulation is very 
limited. There is no systematic cross-country comparative approach on NRAs 
com pressed into one structural study, but several involving singular cases of re-
gulatory authorities. Evaluating peculiar paradigms “can provide a basis for ac-
counting specific patterns, but lacks on presenting the consequences and outco-
mes of large-scale transformations” (Donsbach and Patterson, 2004). Systematic 
comparative research in a cross-national perspective can contribute with an en-
compassing panorama of the interrelations between media and political systems. 
In recent years, scholars have analyzed the various models of broadcasting reg-
ulation testing criteria such as the means of ownership, control, financing, extent 
of services, programming policy. Some of the key questions in the literature can be 
summarized as follows: the main functions of broadcasting regulators (Hoffmann-
Riem, 1996); the role carried out by ministries; the degree of independence and 
the extent of the autonomy of regulators affected by their dependence on the 
Go vernment or Parliament (Verhoest et al., 2004a, 2005b; Magetti, 2007; Dahl, 
1989; Huntington, 1968; Walzer, 1983; Hills, 1986, 1991; Newberg, 1989a, 1989b). 
American researchers have classified broadcasting regulators examining some of 
the indicators mentioned earlier (ownership, control and financing). They ex-
plored areas such as history, economics in business, advertising, law and social as-
pects of regulation (Finn and Chester, 1978; Fedler, 1978; Head and Sterling, 1982). 
By way of illustration, Bittner (1980) describes the attributes of the Federal 
Communication Commission (FCC), pointing out that controlling broadcas-
ting “extends beyond government owned media (...) including privately owned 
broadcast media”. Bittner (1980) found that ownership may be by the Govern-
ment, public corporation, private enterprise or hybrid arrangements (involving 
the state). A different theoretical approach for analyzing broadcasting is How-
ell’s (1986) “Four Worlds” taxonomy”, a method which helps describing the in-
ternational relations; The First World —advanced democracies of the West; the 
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Second World— post-communist countries; the Third World —the emerging de-
mocracies in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Central and Latin America; the Fourth 
World— the stateless cultures existing within nations. Howell (1986) tests indi-
cators such as ownership typologies, financial support mechanisms, dominant 
national models, operational autonomy and organizational structure. 
Albert Namurois (1972) reviews the world system of telecommunications, ra-
dio and TV services, presenting a typology of regulators based on four means of 
control: state-operated directly by a government ministry, department or admin-
istrative agency; public corporation operated autonomously under state charter; 
public interest partnership operated by legally chartered private corporations 
with state stock interests; private enterprise operated by private individuals or 
companies under governmental license with generally weak regulations. 
European scholars have examined the changing practices, structures and 
contents of communication policies mostly focusing on particular regions such 
as the Nordic countries (Balcytiene, 2012; Lund, 2007), Western Europe (Hum-
phreys, 1996; Kuhn and Stanyer, 1999; Rogers and Balle, 1985), Southern Europe 
(Botella Corral, 2001, 2007), Central-Eastern Europe (Balabanova, 2007; Splichal, 
1994). Kuhn and Stanyer (1999), for instance, discuss regulatory issues in con-
temporary France and Britain, bringing out the relation between television and 
the state. The authors evaluate variables as market entry, media ownership and 
television content, arguing that setting regulatory bodies demonstrates “the re-
fusal of those in power to become directly involved in the administration of the 
audiovisual sector”. Concepts such as “media ownership” and “public interest” 
are associated with liberal market values by scholars describing media regulation 
in the Baltic zone (Nieminen, 2009). Balcytiene (2009) argues that none of the 
Baltic countries have any laws against media concentration, although the state 
plays an active role in imposing restrictions on the amount of political adverti-
sing in the media. Moving towards the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the 
institutional models of regulation developed after the collapse of the communist 
system in the early 1990s are recurrent in the recent literature (Gross, 2002; Gu-
lyás, 1999, 2003; Mihelj and Downey, 2012). In this area, economic and social-
cultural variables might explain the divergent approaches to ethnic and cultural 
diversity across different media systems.
Studying the direct links among different models of democracies and NRAs is 
still a work in progress. So far, in the search for general communication patterns 
and their consequences, the investigation of institutional arrangements has been 
important when comparing systematically different media and political systems 
(Voltmer, 2000; Siebert et al., 2006; Mughan and Gunther 2000; Hallin and Man-
cini, 2004; Snow, 1986). Preliminary work on institutional arrangements such as 
the budget frames and the appointment of the heads was undertaken by several 
scholars (Gilardi, 2001; Cukierman et al., 1992; Bernhard, 1998; Siebert, Peterson 
and Schramm, 1963; Stone, 1991). Warrick Smith (1997) classifies the regulators 
according to their institutional independence, dividing these bodies in tradi-
tional ministerial and fully independent authorities. Geradin and Petit (2004) 
list a typology of regulators according to the tasks they have to perform: imple-
mentation, observation, cooperation, yet-to-be-implemented tasks. Another ap-
proach has been undertaken by Emmanuelle Machet (2002). She looks at the ap-
pointment of heads and the funding of regulatory bodies, identifying five main 
models of appointment and three different models of funding: appointment by 
the executive (“the Northern European model”), by legislative (“the Central Eu-
ropean model”), by both executive and legislative (“the French model”), by the 
judiciary, social movements and groups/civil society (“the German model”). Ma-
chet (2002) presents three models of funding: through the state budget, through 
a percentage of licence fees or advertising revenue, and through a mixed system.
A more recent contribution is the INDIREG report (“Indicators for indepen-
dence and efficient functioning of audiovisual media services regulatory bodies 
for the purpose of enforcing the rules in the AVMS Directive” SMART 2009/0001, 
2011), which identified indicators for independence and efficient functioning 
of audiovisual media regulatory bodies. The outcome is an assessment of the 
level of independence and of the efficient functioning in five different dimen-
sions: “status and powers”, “financial autonomy”, “autonomy of decision-mak-
ers”, “knowledge” and “accountability and transparency”. The main objective is 
to give an overview on the status quo of audiovisual regulators in 43 countries 
(Member States of the EU, candidate and potential candidate countries to the 
European Union, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries, USA, 
Australia, Singapore and Japan). The INDIREG report (2011) fails in the attempt 
to create categories of broadcasting regulators, due to “the very specific develop-
ment paths of media regulation in different countries”. The authors argue that 
the project “turned out not to be successful, since there is no analytical necessity 
for regulatory settings in different countries to follow distinct patterns”. 
The study in hand aims at scaling the potential for autonomy of NRAs across 
Europe. The series of characteristics of the two indicators we test —appointment 
of heads and financial settings— are presented later in the paper.
CONSENSUS AND MAJORITARIAN APPROACHES TO NRAS
In this section we explain why we apply Lijphart’s (1999) and Hallin and 
Mancini’s (2004) theoretical frameworks as explanatory tools for mapping broad-
casting regulators in Europe. For this purpose, we infer theoretical arguments 
quoted in the literature. 
The links among regulatory authorities in broadcasting and consensus and 
majoritarian democracy are advanced in the normative study Comparing media 
systems (2004). When exploring and classifying media systems in 18 nations 
within North America and Western Europe, Hallin and Mancini (2004) focus 
on political variables such as political history, consensus vs. majoritarian go-
vernment (Lijphart, 1999), individual vs. organized pluralism, and rational-legal 
authority. As media variables, four dimensions were proposed: the structures of 
the media market, political parallelism, the development of journalistic profes-
sionalism, and the role of the state. 
In their normative study, Hallin and Mancini (2004) show that features of 
media systems correspond with the two dimensions of democracy in Lijphart’s 
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(1999) terms: “Political system characteristics are manifested more or less directly 
in media structures, as for example majoritarian or consensus patterns of govern-
ment are reflected in the organization of public broadcasting institutions”. The 
authors present four basic models of governance of public broadcasting, that by 
approximation may frame the political control over NRAs. In the government 
model public broadcasting is controlled directly by the government or by the 
political majority (Western Europe, Greece, Portugal and Spain). Here, directors 
of public broadcasting are appointed by Parliament, not directly by the govern-
ment, “but this in the end gives the majority party effective control” (Hallin 
and Mancini, 2004). The second model is the professional one, where a strong 
tradition developed that broadcasting should be “largely insulated from politi-
cal control” and run by broadcasting professionals (UK, Canada, USA, Ireland, 
some Scandinavian countries). In the parliamentary or proportional representa-
tion model control over public broadcasting is divided among political parties 
by proportional representation (PR). Finally, in the civic or corporatist model the 
control of public service broadcasting is distributed among various social and 
political groups (Germany, Austria and Netherlands). 
When accounting the three-fold classification based on the mentioned indi-
cators, Hallin and Mancini (2004) make an important statement: “the relations-
hips (between the variables) proposed must be considered hypotheses, given the 
preliminary nature of this research”. Following these normative assessments, our 
study aims to fill the existing gap left by the limited articulations on the reflection 
of majoritarian and consensus patterns of government over NRAs in different 
media systems. For this purpose, we focus on a set of characteristics of democracy 
in Lijphart’s (1999) terms to examine the effects of legislative provisions (such 
as appointment of heads and means of funding) on the independence of NRAs 
across Europe. Before describing in detail variables such as the indepen dence of 
Central Banks, Proportional Representation (PR), and Veto Players, we present 
briefly Lijphart’s typology of modern democracy, considered to be one of the 
most “innovative contributions” in comparative politics (Mainwaring, 2001). 
The main argument for being “the single most influential” is that the patterns 
of consensus and majoritarian democracies cannot be identified beyond his ori-
ginal sample (Bormann, 2010). In his book Patterns of Democracy (1999), Lijphart 
asks the question “who governs and in whose interest in cases of disagreement” 
and his empirical tests provide relevant differences between majoritarian and 
consensus democracy in terms of power sharing. The majoritarian model features 
a majority cabinet, a two-party system, a disproportional system of elections, a 
unitary and centralized government, and unicameralism. Diametrically opposed, 
consensus democracy tends toward power sharing, a broad coalition cabinet, a 
multi-party system, a proportional electoral system, a federal and decentralized 
government, and a strong bicameralism. Lijphart concludes that consensus de-
mocracies are better, “kinder and gentler” forms of ruling than majoritarian ones 
(Bormann, 2010). 
The connection among the institutional design of NRAs in different media 
systems and the configuration of political systems is narrowly analyzed in the 
literature. The potential for autonomy of regulators has been discussed in co-
rrelation with the independence of Central Banks (Rogoff, 1985). This issue re-
presents a core concept in Lijphart’s work on democracy, as the independence 
of Central Banks is highly correlated with the federal-unitary dimension (the 
guaranteed division of power). Lijphart (1999) argues that central banks play 
a crucial role in the policy process if they are strong and independent. In cases 
when central banks depend on the executive, the degree of independence decre-
ases. According to Lijphart (1999), in consensus democracies central banks enjoy 
a higher rate of independence, while in majoritarian systems the potential for 
independence declines: “Giving central banks independent power is yet another 
way of dividing power and fits the cluster of divided-power characteristics (the 
second dimension) of the consensus model of democracy; central banks that 
are subservient to the executive fit the concentrated-power logic of majoritarian 
democracy” (Lijphart, 1999). Central Banks independence comprises two ele-
ments (Alesina and Summers, 1993; Maggetti, 2007): political independence, “as 
the ability to select policy objectives without influence from the government”, 
and economic independence, “the ability to use instruments of monetary po-
licy without restrictions”. The distinctions between formal (de jure) and infor-
mal (de facto) independence of different regulatory agencies are drawn by Gilardi 
(2001) as follows: the status of the agency head and/or management board; the 
relationship among the agency and politicians; the budget; the competencies 
delegated to the authority. Considering Lijphart’s (1999) empirical findings on 
the independence of Central Banks and indexing indicators for potential of au-
tonomy of NRAs looking at the appointment procedures and budget frames, it 
may be hypothesized that majoritarian Polarized Pluralist countries (Hallin and 
Mancini, 2004) correspond with lower ratings of institutional autonomy of re-
gulators. In opposition, due to the appointment procedures and budget frames, 
we estimate a higher rating of institutional autonomy in consensus Democratic 
Corporatist and Liberal countries. We present a more detailed argumentation 
later in the Discussions section.
Proportional Representation (PR) is the second key indicator that can confi-
gure the potential for autonomy of NRAs. Proportional representation (PR) divi-
des and distributes political power among different parties in proportion to the 
votes they receive. Proportional Representation “is likely to be associated with 
multiparty systems, coalition governments (including, in many cases, broad and 
inclusive coalitions), and more equal executive-legislative power relations” (Li-
jphart, 1999). In other words, consensus democracy tends toward proportional 
representation (PR), while the typical electoral system of majoritarian democracy 
is “the single-member district plurality or majority system”. We question whether 
the distribution of political power is reflected in the composition of the board 
members of NRAs and if PR influences the degree of financial autonomy of regu-
lators. The literature on regulation mentions two types of affiliations between the 
public broadcaster and the state (INDIREG, 2011). Countries such as Germany, 
Austria and Netherlands represent the proportionality model, where the influ-
ence of political parties and civil society groups is reflected in the governance of 
the public broadcaster. In the insulated public broadcaster model independent 
regulators are required (the UK, Ireland and the Scandinavian countries). A key ar-
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gument favouring PR in the board of regulators is that “the fair representation of 
<socially significant groups> can guarantee a certain degree of independence from 
political interference, as (...) all main parties have a voice” (INDIREG, 2011). On 
the other side, there is an increasing risk of political constraints: politicians can be 
appointed in boards and “socially significant groups already have strong political 
allegiances” (INDIREG, 2011). Preliminary estimations regarding the influence of 
Proportional Representation (PR) on the appointment of heads and budget set-
tings of NRAs are presented in the fifth part of the paper.
We analyze the potential for autonomy of NRAs in relation with the num-
ber of Veto Players in a polity (Hanretty, 2010). Veto Players focuses on “how 
many individual or collective actors need to agree in order to change the sta-
tus quo” (Tsebelis, 2006). According to Lijphart (1999), the number of Veto 
Players and their polarisation influences the differences among presidential 
and parliamentary systems. In terms of regulatory issues, this means that the 
independence of NRAs in different political regimes is directly linked with the 
existence of Veto Players and influenced by the degree of ideological distance 
(Hanretty and Koop, 2012). In countries where political parties are polarised 
(consensus democracies) a higher degree of autonomy of regulators is expec-
ted, as we will emphasize in section V. Hanretty (2010) argues that where mul-
tiple Veto Players “need to agree, the match between any appointing actor 
and the appointed person will be looser”. Consequently, in consensus demo-
cracies regulators enjoy a higher degree of autonomy due to the influence of 
Veto Players in NRAs’appointment procedures. Contrary, we rate NRAs in ma-
joritarian democracies with a lower degree of autonomy due to the influence 
of Veto Players in appointment procedures. 
Following this line, our research aims to test the interrelations among fea-
tures of democratic political regimes in different media systems. At this point, 
we hypothesize a strong relationship between the degree of autonomy of NRAs 
and elements of consensus and majoritarian democracies. We are filling the exis-
ting gap left by the limited ties between broadcasting regulation and political 
systems, exploring whether Hallin and Mancini’s hypotheses regarding the re-
flection of majoritarian or consensus patterns of government over broadcasting 
regulatory institutions can be theoretically and empirically argued.
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1.  In consensus democracies the potential for autonomy of the heads  
  of NRAs increases due to the appointment procedure. In majoritarian  
  de mocracies the potential for autonomy of the heads of NRAs 
  decreases due to the appointment procedure.
It can be predicted that political control over NRAs decreases with the number 
of players involved. The partisanship of nomination, representation or reproduc-
tion of political power structures in the board composition of NRAs is more likely 
to mirror political majorities (INDIREG, 2011). In majoritarian political systems, 
appointment of the governing board of NRAs by proportional representation 
results in control of the political majority, even if broadcasting regulators are 
formally under the authority of parliament and not directly supervised by the 
government (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). 
Hypothesis 2.  In consensus democracies the potential for autonomy of NRAs increases  
  due to the influence of more players regarding the budget allocation. 
  In majoritarian democracies the potential for autonomy of NRAs
  decreases due to the influence of one single player regarding the budget  
  allocation. 
It can be expected that signifi cant changes in the budget allocation for regula-
tors indicate less institutional autonomy of heads of NRAs. A higher degree of 
institutional autonomy is expected in countries where there is a relative stability 
and continuity in allocating the budget. According to the literature consulted, 
political parties do not constrain regulatory bodies in countries where the parlia-
ment sets and approves the budget. Also, in countries where the budget frames is 
protected by legislative means, evidence suggests less political pressure on NRAs. 
In contrast, where external parties have a “legal influence on the level of the 
budget, they can undermine its operational capacity by denying its adequate 
financing” (INDIREG, 2011).
DATA AND METHODS
We develop comparative research on broadcasting regulation across 47 European 
countries, testing two variables: appointment of heads and means of funding. 
We expect that the examination of various regulatory systems highlights the de-
gree of institutional autonomy of NRAs. The sample selected allows newer demo-
cracies to be contrasted with older ones. We are currently constructing a database 
on NRAs across Europe, collecting data from different sources such as official 
documents, statutes, constitution, laws, terms of reference, rules of procedures, 
the financial regulations. Also, this comparative study relies on a secondary eva-
luation of existing material that has already been produced in the countries in 
question. The evolution and the forms of broadcasting regulation across Europe 
is presented in a cross-national, cross-time, and cross-issue analysis of patterns of 
regulation. To answer the proposed research questions, we triangulate different 
methods:
• Analysis of documents and academic literature; 
• Evaluation of statistical data (EUROSTAT);
• Cross – cases comparison: legal frameworks, national regulatory structures 
and political systems; 
• Questionnaires about political and media environments in which national 
regulators operate;
• Interviews with the head members of NRAs in Europe (a representative NRA 
for each model of media system). 
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Testing the potential for autonomy
Appointment procedure
From the literature we derived the following indicators regarding the appointment 
procedure, which outlined our first hypothesis aimed at measuring the degree of 
autonomy of the heads of NRAs (Gilardi, 2001; INDIREG, 2011; Fernandez-i-
Marin, Saz-Carranza and Vandendriessche, 2012): 
•  Nomination body
• Appointment body
• Appointment mechanism
• Veto capacity
• Term of office
• Renewability of office
• Dismissal procedure
• Eligibility
• Incompatibilities
Data is also collected on the term of office of the heads of the regulatory body 
(if coincides or not with the election cycle), on the renewability of appointment 
(limited to one or two instances), on the partisanship of nomination, represen-
tation or reproduction of political power structures in board composition, the 
possibilities of the appointing body to exert pressure on the appointed member, 
tenures and salaries. The data collected on the appointment procedure may in-
dicate the level of control over the heads, and by approximation, over the NRAs 
(Fernandez-i-Marin, Saz-Carranza and Vandendriessche, 2012).
The literature on regulation does not mention a unique correct model for 
nomination and appointment procedure. Across Europe there are different mo-
dels of appointment of heads of NRAs. For instance, countries where the Exe-
cutive is predominant in the appointment procedures are Austria, Ireland and 
Malta. Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Portugal and Greece are models with a 
predominance of parliament. Countries like Italy, Spain, Romania and France 
are models involving both parliament and the executive in the nomination and 
appointment procedures. In some cases, such as Bulgaria, some of German Län-
der, Hungary and Lithuania, civil society and relevant professional organisations 
are involved in nomination and appointment of heads of NRAs.
Financial settings
The means of funding of NRAs represent the second key variable in our analysis 
and framed the second hypothesis of this study. Here, two aspects are crucial: the 
amount and the source of funding. Data indicate that the most common model 
of funding is directly from the state budgets (INDIREG, 2011). In some coun-
tries like Austria, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania and Slovenia the budgets for 
regulators are supplemented by licence fees, the revenues from technical fees or 
application fees, taxes on private broadcasters’ income, donations and grants. 
The procedures of budget settings influence the degree of autonomy of regula-
tors. We expect to see less institutional autonomy in cases where the budget of 
the regulatory authorities depends exclusively on the governments and where 
NRAs do not have “a maximum control of the input of resources on which they 
are dependent” (Baudrier, 2001). 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this section we present some preliminary estimations regarding the potential 
for autonomy of NRAs, with a detailed analysis of the two variables, appointment 
of heads and budget settings. Further research should be done to confirm our 
hypotheses. The study focuses on NRAs in 47 European countries. The innova-
tion of our work consists in introducing new data on the appointment of heads 
of NRAs and budget frames, using these indicators to create a proxy for the au-
tonomy of regulators. We assess the effects of legislative provisions on the inde-
pendence of NRAs in different media systems, accounting for such factors as the 
degree of independence of Central Banks, proportional representation and the 
number of veto players in the polity.
The first dimension to analyze is the potential of autonomy of NRAs mea-
suring variables drawn from the literature (Fernandez-i-Marin, Saz-Carranza 
and Vandendriessche, 2012): the body responsible for the nomination and ap-
pointment, the mechanism of appointment, the possibility of vetoing the can-
didate, the length of the mandate, the possibility of renewal of the mandate, 
the dismissal procedures, the body or person with the power to dismiss and 
formal limitations of eligibility of candidates. According to our preliminary 
index of democracies, the Democratic Corporatist countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland) tend 
towards consensus features of democracy: many political parties, broad coali-
tions, the practice of power sharing between parties, interest groups and cul-
tural communities. In opposition, the Liberal systems (Britain, United States, 
Canada, Ireland) cluster majoritarian elements such as small numbers of politi-
cal parties, domination of two broad, catchall parties, the existence of a unitary 
public interest. Mediterranean countries (France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) 
have government-controlled systems that “leads to diminished cre dibility with 
audiences and sharp conflict between government and opposition” (Hallin and 
Mancini, 2004). In countries such as Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, the 
Netherlands, Slovenia and the UK the appointing authority is the executive 
body (minister/government/council of ministers). In other cases, the appoin-
ting authority is the parliament (Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Portugal), 
socially relevant groups (Germany, Hungary) or a mix of parliament and the 
president (Italy, Spain, Romania, France) (INDIREG, 2011). The term of office 
of heads ranges between two and seven years and does not coincide with the 
election cycle, except for Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Al-
bania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Iceland. In Finland, Norway and 
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Switzerland the general director has a permanent term of office. Specific rules 
for limiting the possibility of dismissal of NRAs heads exist in most of the Euro-
pean countries, excepting the case of Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Swe-
den, Iceland and Luxembourg (INDIREG, 2011). The possibility for autonomy 
increases in cases where appointments last for a long time. The more frequent 
and easily revoked heads’ appointments suggest the opposite (Gilardi, 2001). 
Considering Lijphart’s (1999) empirical evidence on the independence of Cen-
tral Banks described in section III as an indicator for potential of autonomy 
of NRAs, we estimate that regulators in consensus democracies enjoy a higher 
rate of autonomy, while in majoritarian systems the potential for autonomy 
declines. In other words, due to the appointment procedures we rate the Demo-
cratic Corporatist and the Liberal media systems with a higher degree of insti-
tutional autonomy. In opposition, the majoritarian Polarized Pluralist model is 
rated with a lower degree of institutional autonomy.
Recall from section III that the autonomy of NRAs is directly linked with 
the existence of Veto Players. Hanretty and Koop (2010) argue that where few 
Veto Players are involved in appointment of NRAs’ heads “the closer the match 
between the ideal point of the appointing individual and that of the appointed 
person”; conversely, where multiple Veto Players need to reach consensus on ap-
pointments “the match between any appointing actor and the appointed person 
will be looser”. We question whether the autonomy of NRAs is influenced by 
veto players such as courts or special appeal bodies (ministries or governments) 
that can overturn regulator’s decisions (as in Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Liechtenstein). In Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy spe-
cial appeal bodies have powers to give instructions to NRAs. With few exceptions, 
decisions taken by the regulators can be appealed to courts of law. In Estonia, 
Iceland (subject to certain exceptions), Germany there is no appeal procedure in 
place for the decisions taken by the regulator. In most of the European countries, 
courts do not have the power to replace the regulator’s decision with their own, 
but can cancel the decision and remit it back to the regulator. External appeal 
courts can replace regulators’ decisions in thirteen European countries: Ireland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, 
Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Norway and Switzerland. From 
these preliminary findings we can estimate that NRAs in consensus democracies 
enjoy a higher degree of potential for autonomy due to the involvement of more 
veto players in appointment of heads. Contrary, the fewer veto players, the lower 
the rate of autonomy of regulators. 
The second dimension to analyze is the financial means of NRAs that repre-
sents a relevant criterion for the autonomy potential. The most common model 
of funding the regulators is directly from the state budgets. The government pro-
poses and the parliament approves. In Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia, 
Spain and the UK, the budgets are only subject to the approval by government. 
We predict that NRAs in consensus democracies have a higher degree of institu-
tional autonomy due to the influence of proportional representation (PR) on 
budget settings, while NRAs in majoritarian democracies present a lower degree 
of institutional autonomy due to the influence of proportional representation 
(PR) on the budget. The reflection of Proportional Representation (PR) on the 
financial autonomy can be hypothesized based on Lijphart’s (1999) fi ndings re-
garding the allocation of state budgets. He demonstrates that the proportional 
allocation of public funds can be based “on the strenghts that the several seg-
ments have demonstrated in the PR elections”. Where external parties have legal 
influence on the budget, they may exert pressure to get politically motivated de-
cisions and to undermine NRAs’ operational capacity through inadequate finan-
cing. The greater the influence of a single player regarding the budget allocation, 
the more likely it is to be used to punish or reward the body to generate politi-
cally motivated decisions (INDIREG, 2011). To sum up, considering Proportional 
Representation (PR) an indicator for the financial autonomy of NRAs, we rate the 
Democratic Corporatist and the Liberal media systems with a higher degree of 
institutional autonomy. In opposition, we predict a lower degree of institutional 
autonomy in the case of the Polarized Pluralist model. 
As mentioned in the beginning of this section additional research should be 
done to confirm our hypotheses, as our estimations regarding the potential for 
autonomy of NRAs are preliminary.
Comparing the institutional design of NRAs in the European countries is 
representative taking into account the potential of diversity of the audiovisual 
framework. Provisory analysis of our data suggest that measuring the potential 
for autonomy of NRAs, based on the appointment of heads and the financial 
means can lead to a variety of outcomes. As stated, our core hypothesis is the 
strong relationship between the degree of autonomy of NRAs and countries cor-
responding with consensus and majoritarian features of democracy. To sum up, 
the objective of this research is to contribute to the debate on broadcasting regu-
lation across Europe proposing measures for autonomy of National Regulatory 
Authorities (NRAs). We are filling the gap left in the debate on Hallin and Man-
cini’s (2004) paradigm of media models and Lijphart’s (1999) extension of demo-
cracy. Our provisory analysis suggests that there is a strong correlation between 
the degree of autonomy of NRAs and features of democratic regimes. Triangula-
tion of different qualitative and quantitative methods indicate the differences 
between the various levels of autonomy of broadcasting regulators in Europe. 
Indexing regulatory authorities and their outcomes in decision-making processes 
add new dimensions for measuring the performance of government institutions. 
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